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It states that at the end of 1963, Guevara's plan of "rapid industrialization and centralization during the first years of the Revolution brought the economy to its lowest point since Castro came to power." "Guevara's outlook, which approximated present -day Chinese--rather than Soviet--economic practice, was behind the controversy." In July 1964, "two important cabinet appointments signaled the power struggle over internal economic policy which culminated in Guevara's elimination." Another conflict was that Guevara wanted to export the Cuban Revolution to different parts of Latin America and Africa, while "other Cuban leaders began to devote most of their attention to the internal problems of the Revolution." In December, 1964, Guevara departed on a three-month trip to the United States, Africa, and China.When he returned, according to the CIA report, his economic and foreign policies were in disfavor and he left to start revolutionary struggles in other parts of the world.But they do offer significant and valuable information on the high-level U. interest in tracking his revolutionary activities, and U. In domestic policy, his economic strategy of rapid industrialization has "brought the economy to its lowest point since Castro came to power," the paper argues.In foreign policy, he "never wavered from his firm revolutionary stand, even as other Cuban leaders began to devote most of their attention to the internal problems of the revolution." With Guevara no longer in Cuba, the CIA's assessment concludes, "there is no doubt that Castro's more cautious position on exporting revolution, as well as his different economic approach, led to Che's downfall." U. Army, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Activation, Organization and Training of the 2d Battalion - Bolivian Army, April 28, 1967 This memorandum of understanding, written by the head of the U. MILGP (Military Group) in Bolivia and signed by the commander of the Bolivian armed forces, created the Second Ranger Battalion to pursue Che Guevara's guerrilla band.Written by presidential advisor, Walt Rostow, the memo reports that Guevara may be "operational" and not dead as the CIA apparently believed after his disappearance from Cuba.CIA, Intelligence Information Cable, October 17, 1967 This CIA cable summarizes intelligence, gathered from September 1966 through June 1967, on the disagreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba over Che Guevara's mission to Bolivia.Castro, he argues, will be subject to "we told you so" criticism from older leftist parties, but his "spell on the more youthful elements in the hemisphere will not be broken." The analysis fails to incorporate evidence of the disagreement between Castro and Guevara on the prospects for revolution in Latin America, or the Soviet pressure on Cuba to reduce support for insurgent movements in the Hemisphere.CIA, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Fidel Castro Delivers Eulogy on Che Guevara, October 19, 1967 On October 18, 1967, the third day of national mourning, Fidel Castro delivered a eulogy to a crowd of almost one million at the Plaza de La Revolución in Havana.
The selected documents, presented in order of the events they depict, provide only a partial picture of U. intelligence and military assessments, reports and extensive operations to track and "destroy" Che Guevara's guerrillas in Bolivia; thousands of CIA and military records on Guevara remain classified. CIA, The Fall of Che Guevara and the Changing Face of the Cuban Revolution, October 18, 1965 This intelligence memorandum, written by a young CIA analyst, Brian Latell, presents an assessment that Guevara's preeminence as a leader of the Cuban revolution has waned, and his internal and international policies have been abandoned.
Che chooses Bolivia as the revolutionary base for various reasons.
First, Bolivia is of lower priority than Caribbean Basin countries to US security interests and poses a less immediate threat, "... ." Second, Bolivia's social conditions and poverty are such that Bolivia is considered susceptible to revolutionary ideology.
Rodrguez and Villoldo became part of a CIA task force in Bolivia that included the case officer for the operation, "Jim", another Cuban American, Mario Osiris Riveron, and two agents in charge of communications in Santa Clara.
Rodrguez emerged as the most important member of the group; after a lengthy interrogation of one captured guerrilla, he was instrumental in focusing the efforts to the 2nd Ranger Battalion focus on the Villagrande region where he believed Guevara's rebels were operating.